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ABSTRACT: How do crying foul strategies, such as accusing an opponent of trying to “terrify” into a
decision, pressure arguers to argue well? I submit that they work by (1) making a norm determinate and (2)
making manifest the badness of the tactic. I explain why they generate pressure to repair or abandon
questionable tactics, particularly when the norms converge with those of a broader political culture.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How do arguers pressure each other to argue well, and why may they expect the
strategies they use to work? Answers to these questions depend on the situation,
including the political culture. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) have suggested that
arguers ought not to “automatically” counter fallacious moves by invoking rules with a
“goody two-shoes response” (p. 436), and Jackson and Jacobs (2006) have suggested that
making norms of argument determinate—by saying for example that “no reason has been
given to suggest that those doubts are well-founded” (p. 96)—can be an effective
countermove. I submit a theory that explains why.
Using the methods of a normative pragmatic perspective (e.g., Manolescu 2005,
pp. 139-42), I propose to analyze “crying foul” strategies and explain why they may
pressure arguers to repair or abandon questionable tactics and adhere to norms of
argumentation in a particular situation. Examples of “crying foul” strategies include
saying that an opponent has tried to “frighten” or “terrify” into a decision, has exclaimed
“with uncommon vehemence,” and the like. I submit that they work by (1) making a
norm determinate and (2) making manifest the badness of the tactic. The force of or
pressure generated by crying foul strategies to repair or abandon a questionable tactic
derives from the fact that different kinds or levels of norms are built into them—both
more transaction-level norms such as using relevant evidence and more procedure-level
norms such as speaking in a manner that enables good judgment. The pressure increases
as the norms of argumentation converge with those of a broader political culture. After
outlining how a normative pragmatic approach to countering questionable tactics
supplements comparable approaches, I analyze crying foul strategies used in a case of
actual, high-stakes political argumentation.
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2. A NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO COUNTERING QUESTIONABLE
TACTICS
Two ways that a normative pragmatic approach to countering questionable tactics
supplements some of the leading scholarship on dialectically-oriented pragmatic
approaches to fallacies are the following. First, a normative pragmatic approach works
from the inside out; it begins by examining the transaction itself—by asking what
strategies arguers use and why. This is in contrast to an approach that works from the
outside in—by applying rules or norms to particular cases. So for example the pragmadialecticians define fallacies as violations of rules or norms for a critical discussion—a
theoretical ideal—and they bring theoretical coherence to the project of classifying
fallacies by basing them on the stages—opening, confronting, arguing, concluding—of a
critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 102-106).
Similarly, Walton (1992, 1995, 2000) has argued that critics ought to evaluate
specific tactics by measuring them against the goals of the dialogue type such as a critical
discussion. His research builds upon the pragma-dialectical research program by, first,
expanding the number and kind of dialogues beyond critical discussions to include
persuasion, negotiation, and more. These dialogue types serve as theoretical ideals; as
Walton (2000) notes, actual discourse such as political argumentation may not be easily
classified into a single dialogue type. For Walton fallacies occur as arguers shift from one
dialogue type to another—from, say, a critical discussion to a negotiation dialogue; a
tactic may be appropriate in one dialogue type because it helps to achieve the goal of the
dialogue type, but the same tactic may be inappropriate in another dialogue type because
it interferes with achieving the goal. Thus a second way that Walton's research builds
upon the pragma-dialectical research program is by assuming that there are degrees of
fallaciousness and that researchers ought to attend to the context of the argumentation in
evaluating whether a questionable tactic is a fallacy or blunder amenable to repair.
Researchers working from a normative pragmatic perspective, in contrast, work
from the inside out. A normative pragmatic theory explains how saying something makes
it easier or more difficult to subsequently say other things. The explanation is neither
limited to the particular case at hand nor an asituational account in the sense that the rules
of a critical discussion are theoretical ideals regardless of the situation. They begin by
asking what strategies arguers use and explain why arguers may reasonably expect the
strategies to work in a given situation. Their research has shown that arguers use
strategies that bring to bear in their particular situation norms of argumentation, and that
the norms help to account for why arguers use particular strategies and may expect them
to work (Goodwin 2001; Kauffeld 1998; Manolescu 2005).
A second way that a normative pragmatic approach to countering questionable
tactics supplements some of the leading scholarship on dialectically-oriented pragmatic
approaches to fallacies is that it lends itself to asking how arguers try to pressure
opponents to repair or abandon questionable tactics and why they may reasonably expect
such strategies to work. For dialectically-oriented pragmatic approaches to fallacies, such
moves would be viewed as secondary to the argument proper. Dialectically-oriented
pragmatic approaches analyze argumentation with an eye toward how it achieves the goal
of a given dialogue type, and countering questionable tactics at least at first glance seems
to be less relevant to issues at hand in any given dialogue than to the procedure by which
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decisions are made and justified. At best strategies designed to counter questionable
tactics may be treated as a sub-discussion within the argument proper and at worst may
be outside of the scope of analysis altogether. But given the ubiquity of questionable
tactics, it is worth studying how arguers themselves characteristically attempt to counter
them.
Since a normative pragmatic perspective begins with the transaction itself, its
analytical methods involve examining strategies arguers actually use. In addition, the
perspective views the context not in terms of a dialogue type from which goals are
deduced, but instead as something created by speaking itself (Goodwin 2007). It explains
how saying something enables and constrains how auditors may respond and what
arguers themselves may subsequently say. In the course of explaining why strategies may
be expected to work, researchers analyzing argumentation from a normative pragmatic
perspective also explain why, other things being equal, questionable tactics do not
generate force or pressure (Manolescu 2005, pp. 146-47; Manolescu 2007, pp. 391-93).
This research has shown that the weak pressure or lack of pressure of questionable tactics
involves deviating from norms. In this study I continue that line of research by explaining
why arguers can expect crying foul to counter questionable tactics to pressure opponents
to make repairs or abandon the tactic.
A fundamental assumption that a normative pragmatic perspective shares with
pragma-dialectical perspectives is that researchers ought to consider how arguers balance
goals that may at times be at odds with each other. The pragma-dialecticians’ recent
research on strategic manoeuvring involves analyzing how arguers balance the goals of a
critical discussion with individual success, and evaluating how they do so against the
rules of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2006, p. 436). In this study I
supplement that line of research by using a different analytical method—asking what
strategies arguers use and why rather than reconstructing the argumentation as a critical
discussion or analyzing strategic manoeuvring in terms of topic potential, audience
adaptation, and presentational devices—and by examining what norms arguers bring to
bear on the situation rather than applying a predetermined set of norms.
3. CRYING FOUL
To explain why arguers may expect crying foul about questionable tactics to pressure
opponents to repair or abandon them, I analyze crying foul strategies in the 1788 Virginia
ratifying convention debates. The debates are a circumscribed case of actual, high-stakes
civic argumentation in which participants use and call each other on the use of
questionable tactics. The issue was whether Virginia should ratify the proposed United
States Constitution, and upon arrival to the convention delegates were almost evenly split
(Briceland 1988, pp. 212-13; Einhorn 1990, pp. 148-49). But delegates did not argue only
to garner support from those few who were amenable to persuasion. The debates took
place before a viewing public in the galleries; in fact the venue for the debates was
changed to accommodate more spectators. Moreover, the debates were published.
Delegates therefore argued with an eye not only toward their peers but also toward
constituents, a broader reading public, and posterity. For these audiences, delegates say
they argue for other purposes including representing their constituents' views (e.g., Elliot
1891, pp. 21, 63) and showing posterity that they did everything possible for the benefit
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of Virginia and the Union (e.g., Elliot 1891, pp. 56, 637, 652). These purposes are easier
to separate analytically than practically; saying they argue for posterity, for example, may
be a way of persuading peers or garnering support from constituents. The point is that the
arguers had multiple purposes for multiple audiences—not only or primarily persuading
to believe the proposed constitution should or should not be ratified, or to vote for or
against its ratification.
There is any number of ways to cry foul, but I submit that core features are that
crying foul (1) makes a norm determinate and (2) makes manifest that the opponent is
damaging the deliberations. I call these core features because, as I explain in the
discussion to follow, they both define crying foul strategies and give them force—that is,
pressure opponents to repair or abandon the questionable tactic.
Making a norm determinate
First, consider a case where a speaker counters a questionable tactic by stating a claim
and providing evidence only—without any meta-discussion or sub-discussion about the
propriety of the tactic or, put differently, without crying foul. In the best case, the speaker
can count on the merit of her argument to “speak for itself.” She can count on her
opponent and spectators to see that she adheres to norms of argumentation while the
opponent does not; and therefore can count on the opponent to hold himself to a higher
standard and on spectators to hold the opponent to a higher standard. However, these
assumptions seem risky in a context where questionable tactics are ubiquitous. In such
contexts, if logical coherence alone pressured arguers to repair or abandon questionable
tactics, then we would expect arguers to bring to bear on the situation the force of the
better argument only.
In a worse case, if the speaker does not cry foul about the opponent's questionable
tactic, the opponent will continue to use it because the speaker has not created any reason
for him not to use it and because the opponent presumably used it in the first place
because he believed it would achieve some purpose or purposes. In perhaps the worst
case from the speaker’s perspective, if the speaker does not cry foul about the opponent’s
questionable tactic, then she puts herself at risk of criticism by spectators for poor
judgment--for not recognizing a questionable tactic or, if spectators think she recognizes
the questionability of the tactic, for not trying to promote the legitimacy of the particular
transaction or, more broadly, the procedure. And therefore, even and perhaps especially if
the speaker can count on spectators to hold the opponent to a higher standard, she does
not foreclose the possibility of spectators criticizing her for an oversight or omission.
Now, in contrast, consider a case where the speaker cries foul to counter a
questionable tactic. In the Virginia ratifying convention debates delegates cry foul about
different kinds of questionable tactics. For example, they cry foul about emotional
appeals circumventing reason when they ask: “Are we to be terrified into a belief of its
necessity” (Elliot 1891, p. 285; see also pp. 54, 62, 638). They cry foul about poor
grounds when they assert: “It is a groundless objection, to work on gentlemen’s
apprehensions” (Elliot 1891, p. 427). They cry foul about mismatches between style and
significance when they say that an opponent “has highly colored the dangers” (Elliot
1891, p. 466). Moreover, they cry foul frequently. Even Patrick Henry, the delegate who
speaks most often (Briceland 1988, p. 211; Rutland 1966, p. 226, 233) and almost
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certainly uses questionable tactics most often, complains about delegates who try to make
spectators “intimidated by imaginary dangers” and to lead their minds “away by unfair
misrepresentations and uncandid suggestions” (Elliot 1891, p. 140). What could Henry
and other delegates expect crying foul to do and why?
Crying foul pressures delegates to adhere to a norm by making the norm
determinate because, other things being equal, making the norm determinate makes it
difficult for auditors to say they did not know the norm. In doing so they risk criticism for
being ill-equipped to participate in the proceedings. The risk is particularly serious as
such prerequisites are made manifest throughout the proceedings as delegates say, for
example, that opponents' appeals are “trifling with the judgment of their fellow-citizens”
(Elliot 1891, p. 48), or that politics are “too often nourished by passion, at the expense of
the understanding” (Elliot 1891, p. 23), or that every delegate “comes with a firm
resolution coolly and calmly to examine, and fairly and impartially to determine” (Elliot
1891, p. 42). To avoid the risks, auditors may repair or abandon the questionable tactic
and adhere to the norm. Thus the force of or pressure generated by making a norm
determinate—e.g., do not terrify into belief, do not make groundless objections, do not
misrepresent facts—derives from bringing to bear in the situation and making
determinate broader norms—e.g., do not interfere with the capacity to judge. This
broader norm is both rhetorical and political, that is, a norm of political representation
and citizenship: act in a way that enables good judgment. Making determinate this
broader, political, procedural norm increases the risks to auditors of manifesting poor
judgment on the level of a specific argument, because it makes manifest that localized
flaws damage the proceedings and political process as well.
For similar reasons, making a norm determinate pressures the speaker to adhere to
it. Doing otherwise would be a fallible sign that she is ill-equipped to participate in the
proceedings—that she has an inappropriate understanding of what counts as terrifying,
for example, or that she thinks the norm does not apply to her own actions. Again, the
risk is serious in this case given that broader norms they are grounded in—display and act
in a way that enables good judgment—are also made manifest in the proceedings and
have political analogues. To avoid this risk, the speaker must also avoid using the
questionable tactic and adhere to the norm.
Making badness manifest
There is any number of ways that arguers can make norms determinate. Another core
feature of crying foul strategies is that they make manifest the badness of the opponent’s
conduct. As with making a norm determinate, other things being equal, manifesting the
badness of the opponent's conduct pressures both auditors and speaker to repair, abandon,
or avoid the questionable tactic and adhere to the norm. By crying foul, a speaker
manifests a commitment to the position that the opponent is acting in a way that damages
the deliberations. By pointing to the badness of the deliberations, she makes manifest that
she is upset by the conduct and therefore expects the opponent to answer and make
amends; of course there is no need to make amends for doing something good (Kauffeld
1998, Goodwin 2002). Other things being equal, if an opponent were to continue arguing
in the same way, he risks criticism for continuing to damage the proceedings. In the case
of the Virginia ratification debates, the risk is serious given that delegates had pointed to
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the need for good deliberations. For example, several had pointed to the need to avoid
outside influence (Elliot 1891, pp. 7, 177) or the need to base their decision on “the force
of reasoning” and not “declamation nor elegance of periods” which may “mislead the
judgment” (Elliot 1891, p. 104). To avoid the risks, the opponent may repair or abandon
the tactic and adhere to the norm. Thus the force of making manifest the badness of an
opponent's conduct derives from bringing to bear on the situation converging rhetorical
and political norms—e.g., act in a way that enables good judgment.
By making manifest the badness of an opponent's deliberations, a speaker also
risks criticism. Crying foul licenses the opponent to retaliate, because the speaker has
impugned his conduct. So by crying foul a speaker risks criticism for damaging the
opponent’s good name as well as for damaging the quality of the proceedings. Auditors
could reason that the speaker would not want to put herself at risk for criticism unless she
had made a responsible assessment of the situation, so the speaker undertaking additional
risk for herself creates an additional reason for an opponent to repair or abandon the
questionable tactic. Presumably others would see the conduct that the speaker saw but, by
saying what she saw and manifesting its badness, the speaker brings to bear in the
situation a norm of responsible conduct: do not unfairly impugn an opponent’s conduct.
There are other ways that a speaker may make manifest that she has responsibly
assessed the opponent's conduct. For example, she may make manifest that she has
grounds for making the charge, or she may ask opponents to state exactly what grounds
they have. In fact, throughout the debates delegates call for opponents to provide grounds
(e.g., Elliot 1891, pp. 12, 66, 87). Giving them a chance to make their case shows that she
is exercising forbearance. Again, this is a fallible sign that she has attempted to make a
responsible assessment of the opponent’s conduct and, thus, forestalls criticism that she
has unfairly impugned the conduct. In short, the more a speaker makes manifest the
badness of an opponent's tactics, the greater the risk to the speaker of criticism for her
tactics and conduct, and therefore the stronger the force or pressure on both her and the
opponent to repair or abandon questionable tactics and adhere to norms of argumentation.
4. CONCLUSION
In sum, crying foul pressures auditors to repair or abandon questionable tactics by
making norms determinate and making manifest the badness of the opponent’s tactics.
Crying foul generates pressure by creating risks for both auditors and speaker if they
continue using the questionable tactic. It creates serious risks by bringing to bear on the
situation converging rhetorical and political norms. Making manifest that an opponent
has used shaky grounds to work on auditors' fears, for example, and that in doing so the
opponent damages the quality of the proceedings and the political process, increases the
force of all norms.
This analysis helps to explain van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (2006) observation
that arguers ought not automatically counter fallacious moves by invoking rules with a
goody two-shoes response. The force of the tactic depends on the situation or context. In
the context of a debate class, invoking rules could pressure opponents to adhere to them
because the norms of argumentation align with norms made manifest in the broader
classroom context. In some—perhaps many or all—civic contexts, in contrast, political
actors probably cannot count on auditors having a uniformly good education in sound
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reasoning. This may account for why in the Virginia ratification debates we do not see
arguers invoking rules in a dialectical vein to counter questionable tactics.
If this is accurate, then there are two complementary explanations for why arguers
in the Virginia ratification debates consistently counter questionable tactics by crying foul
and do so by bringing to bear on the situation norms of argumentation that converge with
political norms. First, consider the fact that crying foul makes a norm determinate.
Arguers must bring to bear on the situation norms that auditors do know or ought to
know. This is why they can count on them to pressure auditors to adhere to them. In the
context of a debate by political elites before a broad citizenry, arguers may reasonably
expect auditors to know the broader norms of the political culture. So making norms
determinate both brings to bear on the situation norms that auditors know and coaches
auditors in norms they ought to know.
Second, consider the fact that crying foul makes manifest the badness of the
opponent’s tactic. In a civic context, arguers may not be able to count on auditors
acknowledging the badness of a tactic because by one measure it may align with a norm
of effectiveness. In tension are norms of short-term, personal effectiveness and long-term,
political and cultural effectiveness in the sense of promoting a desirable kind of political
culture. These two senses of effectiveness need not be mutually exclusive, but political
actors must balance short-term personal success with longer-term success and civic
goods. Crying foul—making badness manifest—is one way arguers may tip the balance.
Link to commentary
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